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Abstract. We present a method to control the detection events in quantum key
distribution systems that use gated single-photon detectors. We employ bright pulses
as faked states, timed to arrive at the avalanche photodiodes outside the activation
time. The attack can remain unnoticed, since the faked states do not increase the
error rate per se. This allows for an intercept-resend attack, where an eavesdropper
transfers her detection events to the legitimate receiver without causing any errors. As
a side effect, afterpulses, originating from accumulated charge carriers in the detectors,
increase the error rate. We have experimentally tested detectors of the system id3110
(Clavis2) from ID Quantique. We identify the parameter regime in which the attack
is feasible despite the side effect. Furthermore, we outline how simple modifications in
the implementation can make the device immune to this attack.
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1. Introduction
An intriguing feature of quantum optics is that it enables communication protocols
which are impossible to achieve by classical means. One prominent example is quantum
key distribution (QKD) [1, 2] which in principle allows two parties (Alice and Bob)
to communicate with unconditional security. It is thus impossible for an arbitrarily
powerful eavesdropper (Eve) to obtain knowledge of the transmitted information.
In the well-known Bennett-Brassard 1984 (BB84) protocol in its original form [3],
Alice sends single photons of different polarizations to Bob. Under ideal conditions, the
security of this protocol can be rigorously proved [4]. Furthermore, practically feasible
procedures for distilling a secret key from the exchanged quantum states are known [5].
During the distillation, Alice and Bob generate a key sequence out of their raw data
stemming from the quantum state exchange. Eve’s attempt to gain knowledge results
in a perturbation of the quantum states, such that her information about the raw key
can be upper bounded. Alice and Bob can thus shrink their raw data such that Eve’s
knowledge of the resulting key sequence becomes negligible.
Rigorous security proofs show that Eve cannot successfully attack an ideal
implementation of BB84. However, real implementations always exhibit deviations from
the ideal model. In order to guarantee secure communication, such deviations must
be included into the security proofs. One example is the use of weak coherent states
instead of single photons which is considered in the Gottesmann-Lo-Lu¨tkenhaus-Preskill
(GLLP) security proof [6]. The resulting reduction of the key rate can be mitigated by
modifications to the protocol such as in the decoy state method [7, 8, 9] or in the Scarani-
Acin-Ribordy-Gisin 2004 (SARG04) protocol [10]. More subtle deviations can result in
side channels through which information can unnoticeably leak to Eve. For example,
photons might carry information in unwanted degrees of freedom [11]. Once such side
channels are known, they need to be considered in a more general security proof.
Nowadays, quantum cryptography has matured to the point that several commercial
products are available [12, 13]. Each system might have loopholes which are particular
to its implementation. Some implementations are, for example, susceptible to non-
conforming light pulses that Eve sends into Alice’s or Bob’s devices. Eve could
use reflectometry to read modulator states [14] or take control over the detectors by
sending faked states [15, 16], time-shifted pulses [17], or by detector blinding combined
with faked states [18]. The impact of such interventions strongly depends on the
particular implementation. It is thus difficult to include them in general security proofs.
Alternatively, specific countermeasures could be devised by adapting hard- or software
of the systems, such that all assumptions in the security proof about the QKD module
are again valid.
In this paper, we investigate a particular attack on the QKD device id3110 Clavis2
from ID Quantique. The fibre-based system utilizes the plug&play principle [19] where
the quantum states are encoded as relative phase of two pulses. In our experiment, we
send irregular, bright light pulses (faked states) outside the activation time of the gated
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detectors. We show that we can generate measurement results in the Bob module with
only a slight increase in the quantum bit error rate (QBER), if side effects of the attack
are considered properly.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the basic principles of our
attack. In Section 3, we elaborate on the particular implementation of the detectors
in the Clavis2 system. In Section 4, we present the imperfections found in the system.
Section 5 discusses the side effect of the faked-state attack, which actually partly protects
the security of the system. Section 6 presents all the necessary elements for simulations
and shows the parameters for which the Clavis2 system is not secure. In Section 7,
we discuss possible countermeasures against the proposed attack before concluding in
Section 8.
2. Intercept-resend attack using faked states
In the BB84 protocol [3], Alice randomly chooses one of two non-orthogonal bases to
encode her quantum bit. Bob independently chooses his measurement basis at random.
If his basis matches Alice’s, he will measure the quantum state correctly. In half of
the cases, however, Bob chooses the wrong basis. Alice and Bob compare encoding
and measurement basis via a classical authenticated channel and remove all events with
basis mismatch from their raw data.
In an intercept-resend attack, Eve places a copy of Bob’s apparatus into the
quantum channel. Then she performs the same kind of measurement as Bob, tries
to reproduce the original quantum state and sends it to Bob. Since Eve is unaware
of Alice’s basis choice, she will inevitably introduce errors in case of a basis mismatch
between her basis and the one used by Alice and Bob. Eve will thus always be detected
in a perfect implementation of a QKD system [5, 6].
In case of an imperfect implementation, however, Eve may attack the QKD system
by sending faked states instead of quantum states [15]. Her aim is to generate faked
states which only produce a detection event in the Bob module if Eve’s basis matches
Bob’s basis. In this case, after Alice and Bob discard their non-matching bases, all that
remains in the key are bits for which Alice, Eve and Bob had the same basis. Thus, Eve
generates no errors.
After the attack, Bob and Eve share identical bit values and basis choices. The
attack works on widely used QKD protocols, namely BB84, SARG04, and the decoy
method. The attack exhibits an extra 3 dB loss because of the possible basis mismatch
of Eve and Bob. This is easily compensated in a practical Eve, since she may use better
detector efficiencies and exclude loss in the line [15].
3. Detectors in Clavis2
The impact of faked states strongly depends on the implementation of the detection
scheme in a QKD system. We will focus on systems employing avalanche photodiodes
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Figure 1. Equivalent circuit diagram of Bob’s detectors in Clavis2. See text for
description.
(APDs) in the Geiger mode, as it is the case in many QKD systems [20, 21], and all
commercially available realizations [12, 13]. Furthermore, we assume that the APDs are
gated, i.e. activated only in time intervals when signal states are expected to arrive.
During the activation time, a large reverse voltage is applied to the APDs such that
the APDs are biased above the breakdown voltage. Then a single photon can trigger
a carrier avalanche which results in a macroscopic current. If the generated current
exceeds a certain threshold, a detection event (click) is registered.
As an example, we consider the behavior of the gated detectors in ID Quantique’s
Clavis2 QKD system. A detector circuitry reverse-engineered by us is shown in Figure 1.
The APDs are biased by the high voltage supply with VHV;D0/D1 almost as large as the
breakdown voltage (VHV;D0 = −42.89V and VHV;D1 = −43.08V). The detectors are
gated in Geiger mode by means of TTL signals, which are applied on top of the bias
voltage with a period of 200 ns. The gates are supplied as PECL logic level signals
from the main board and converted to TTL signals by the buffer DD1. The comparator
DA1 monitors the APD current and registers a click in the detector when the current
peak passes a threshold (VTh;D0 = 77mV, VTh;D1 = 84mV). The comparator produces
a PECL output pulse for each detection event.
During all the time not covered by the gate, each APD is biased at a constant
value VHV;D0/D1 below the breakdown voltage. The current through the APD is then
approximately proportional to the incident optical power. The circuit behaves similarly
as a linear photodiode followed by a comparator.
4. Description of loopholes in the system
In the following subsections, we describe two unexpected deviations of the detection
system from the idealized behavior implicitly assumed by the designers of the QKD
system. We start by explaining the detection process in detail. In an ideal plug&play
system, the relative phase between the signal states and reference pulses in the
receiver module (0, pi/2, pi, 3pi/2) is determined by a combined phase modulation of
Alice and Bob, i.e. by a combination of Alice’s bit and basis (0, pi/2, pi, 3pi/2) and
Bob’s measurement basis (0, pi/2).
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Figure 2. Principle of detector control. In the detection part of a phase-encoded
QKD, the two pulses which could be generated by Eve as a faked state interfere at
a 50:50 beamsplitter. (a) For Bob’s basis choice matching Eve’s, the signals interfere
such that detector D0 clicks deterministically, because the photocurrent surpasses the
detection threshold ITh;D0. (b) For Bob’s basis choice not matching Eve’s, the power
is split 50:50 to both detectors. The photocurrent does not surpass the threshold.
Therefore, the faked state is not detected.
Let us consider a standard intercept-resend attack. For a matching basis choice of
Alice, Eve and Bob, the phase difference is 0 or pi. This restricts the possible outcome
of the measurement to a single detector and results in a conclusive outcome for Bob.
For a mismatched basis choice, the phase difference is pi/2 or 3pi/2. In this case, either
of their detectors will click randomly. This clearly causes a QBER of 25%.
4.1. Linear mode APDs
In the linear regime of the APDs, Eve can substitute the quantum states with bright
coherent states [18]. Figure 2 shows examples of pulses which generate a click only if
Bob’s and Eve’s bases match, since the comparator following the APD will only click, if
the input optical power surpasses a critical power threshold. In case of a basis mismatch,
the optical power is distributed equally among the detectors and no detection click is
generated.
To exploit the loophole experimentally, we look closer at the detector characteristics.
As mentioned, the APDs are biased below the breakdown voltage before and after the
gate. Optically, Bob’s phase modulation extends temporally on either side of the gate
pulse by approximately 10 ns. We have verified that the system accepts clicks at least
10.5 ns after the gate, still assigning the click to the bit slot associated with the gate.
We sent bright laser pulses to both detectors before and after they are gated, in
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Figure 3. Detection click thresholds in Clavis2 for a pulse duration of 0.12ns.
(a) Power thresholds PD0,D1;0%,100% for 0% and 100% probability of a bright pulse
detection in detector D0 and D1. The fluctuations are reproducible and are probably
caused by the fluctuating bias voltage after the gate. (b) Calculated Θ(t) (see Eq. 1),
which shows that an atttack is possible for delays of 4.5 ns to 10 ns with an optimal
and comfortable margin of Θ at 7.5 ns.
order to find the click thresholds of each detector. A perfect control of Bob is possible,
if the maximum power at which the detectors do not produce clicks is not lower than
half the power at which they always produce a click. This can be written as
Θ(t) =
min {PD0;0% (t) , PD1;0% (t)}
max {PD0;100% (t) , PD1;100% (t)}
> 0.5, (1)
where t is the time between the leading edge of the gate and the bright pulse, PD0;0%(t) is
the maximum power that does not generate a click in D0 and PD0;100%(t) is the minimum
power that certainly generates a click in D0 (analogously for D1).
We have found that the linear behavior prior to the gate can not be exploited,
since charge carrier generation results in a large afterpulse effect during the gate. For
an attack after the gate, Figure 3 shows the experimentally measured power thresholds
and the corresponding values of Θ(t) for 0.12 ns long 1550 nm laser pulses. The figure
shows that an attack is feasible in a wide time window with the maximum value of
Θ(t) at 7.5 ns after the gate. At this time, a 587µW laser pulse can cause a click in
both detectors, while a 293.5µW laser pulse will never cause a click in any detector.
This result reveals a weak spot in the system. We have found, however, that the attack
can not be applied straightforwardly, because of an afterpulsing side effect, which is
discussed in Section 5. Therefore we attacked at the point 7.75 ns after the gate to
slightly reduce the maximum laser power applied to the system. At 7.75 ns after the
gate, a 575µW laser pulse can cause a click in both detectors, while a 287.5µW laser
pulse will never cause a click in any detector.
4.2. Faked states applied during the dead time
As a second loophole in the system, we have found that the system registers detection
events from bright faked states at any time. Typically, the device applies a dead time
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Figure 4. Dead time extension behavior. The figure shows that if a bright pulse (or
avalanche) causes a dead time (1st DT), any bright pulse during the dead time will
be a valid detection and causes an extra dead time (2nd DT). Therefore it extends
the effective dead time. (upper oscillogram) The gate pattern applied to the detector.
(lower oscillogram) Optical power of successive bright pulses impinging on the detector
with a delay of 4µs.
of 10µs whenever the system registers a click at any of the detectors, not gating both
APDs for the duration of the dead time [24]. However, we have found that the time
between the detection events originating from our faked states can be as short as 30 ns.
Figure 4 shows the effect of a bright pulse arriving during the dead time. The
electronic logic registers a valid click and subsequently resets the dead time to another
10µs after the second bright pulse. We found experimentally that in the deadtime all
faked states with laser peak power of 575µW were detected by detector D0 while the
detection probability of Bob’s D1 was ηB > 0.99985. In Section 6.2, we will show how
this loophole can be exploited in order to overcome the negative side effect of afterpulses,
which is described in the next section.
5. Characterization of afterpulsing side effect
Once a detection is registered in a gated APD, a long dead time is typically applied to
reduce afterpulsing. This dead time is considerably longer than the inverse of the gating
frequency and is typically of the order of several microseconds.
The afterpulse effect is due to carrier traps, which are populated by avalanche
currents in the detection process [21, 25]. We have found that bright pulses also populate
the carrier traps, irrespective of whether they generate detection events or not. Without
a registered detection, a dead time is not applied by the detectors circuitry. The carriers
released from traps can therefore cause afterpulsing in the detector. These uncontrollable
clicks will contribute to the QBER.
We have characterized this side effect of the after-gate attack in the successive
gates by plugging a laser directly to one of the fiber inputs of the 50:50 beamsplitter of
Fig. 2. The laser pulses have a peak power of 287.5µW for each detector. As expected,
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Figure 5. Afterpulses caused by the after-gate attack. The chart shows the
experimentally measured cumulative probability to get at least one dark count after a
287.5µW pulse applied to both detectors (red dots), a Monte Carlo simulation of the
same process using the parameters from Table 1 (solid line).
the pulse never causes a click immediately. However, very often it causes an afterpulse
within the following gates. Figure 5 shows the cumulative probability to get a click in
any of the two detectors in the next gates. After 50 gates, the cumulative probability
to get a random click has reached 84 %, which could jeopardize Eve’s attack by causing
a to high QBER.
Note that the system sends frames of 1075 pulses as dictated by the send-return
configuration [19]. Therefore, the attack can always be applied in the end of the frame
with a reduced risk of a random afterpulse. If the system requires only one detection
every second frame, then the security is completely compromised. Additionally, the
attack may be applicable for a different set of system parameters, e.g. different operation
frequencies of Bob.
We have modeled the afterpulse effects of carrier traps. We have found that the
probabilities Pap;D0/D1 (tj) of a detection event after a faked-state attack can be modelled
using a double exponential decay for the detectors:
Pap;D0/D1 (tj) = Pdark;D0/D1 + (1− Pdark;D0/D1)
2∑
i=1
Ai;D0/D1e
−tj/τi;D0/D1 , (2)
where Pdark;D0/D1 is the dark count probability, Ai;D0/D1 are probability amplitudes that
depend on the number of carriers which are generated in the detector, and τi;D0/D1 are
the associated decay constants. The afterpulse probabilities in Fig. 5 were reproduced by
a Monte Carlo simulation using the double exponential decay model given by Eq. 2. By
iterating the Monte Carlo simulation, the decay parameters were found by minimizing
the squared distance between the measurement data and the simulation data, equivalent
to the method of least squares in regression analysis. Table 1 shows the resulting
decay parameters, and the final Monte Carlo simulation is shown in Fig. 5. The decay
parameters are in agreement with earlier published data on APDs [21, 25].
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Detector 0 Detector 1
Parameter Value Parameter Value
Pdark;D0 1.158 · 10
−4 Pdark;D1 3.812 · 10
−4
A1;D0 3.572 · 10
−2 A1;D1 1.068 · 10
−1
A2;D0 2.283 · 10
−2 A2;D1 5.054 · 10
−2
τ1;D0 1.159µs τ1;D1 0.705µs
τ2;D0 4.277µs τ2;D1 3.866µs
Table 1. Decay parameters of trap levels in both detectors. These parameters were
used for the Monte Carlo simulation shown in Fig. 5.
6. Simulations of after-gate attack and QBER estimation
We estimate the QBER for different attack scenarios using a Monte Carlo simulation.
In our simulation, Alice and Bob use the BB84 protocol. Eve performs a faked-state
attack by putting her modified Bob and Alice modules in the channel. Eve places her
Bob module in the beginning of the line next to Alice. We assume that Alice sends an
optimized signal amplitude [22] where the sent mean photon number µ is equal to the
channel transmittance T . Unless otherwise noted, Eve measures this signal with perfect
detectors (100% efficiency and noiseless) and a lossless aparatus. Then she reproduces
a bright faked state with the corresponding bit value for Bob.
Bob’s module is simulated including realistic parameters which were determined
experimentally for our device. Besides the parameters for the afterpulsing and dark
count effects (see Table 1), there are the optical transmittance of Bob’s setup (TB =
0.412), the quantum efficiency of the detectors (ηB = 0.1) and the detector dead time
(τdead = 10µs).
In the simulation, we process the consecutive gates of a frame separately. We
incorporate the side effect by increasing the afterpulse probability of a detector, if
carriers were generated either by a regular avalanche or by bright pulses with full or
half power‡. We have experimentally verified that for the operation frequency and used
optical powers the carrier traps in the detectors are not saturated by our attack and
that the afterpulses of the two carrier-generating processes with different lifetimes occur
independently and with Poissonian statistics [23]. The afterpulse probability of a gate
at time tj is then increased by a previous gate with carrier generation at time tk as
P newap;D0/D1(tj) = P
old
ap;D0/D1(tj) + (1− P
old
ap;D0/D1(tj))×
2∑
i=1
γi;D0/D1Ai;D0/D1e
−(tj−tk)/τi;D0/D1 , (3)
where γi;D0/D1 is a correction of the probability amplitude Ai;D0/D1. In case of a bright
pulse attack with 287.5µW pulses γi;D0/D1 = 1. For a bright pulse attack with full
575µW power to one detector (successful attack), we increase the afterpulse probability
‡ Carrier generation by the half-power pulses is the most important effect, because the system does
not apply the deadtime after them.
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c
N
Figure 6. We attack only the last χ gates of the total number of gates N = 1075 in
the frame, such that the raw key rate generated by the attack on each frame is equal
to the rate without eavesdropping.
twice applying Equation 3. We have measured that a regular avalanche in D0 and D1
has {γi;D0, γi;D1} = {1.836, 3.673}.
6.1. Strategy of Eve with dead time
We first simulated the QBER without the deadtime loophole described in Section 4.2,
i.e. assuming that Bob rejects detection events during the detector dead time. To
increase the performance of Eve’s attack, she adopts the following strategy: (i) Attack
only the last χ gates of the total of N gates of a frame, as shown in Figure 6. This
will lead to a larger trapped carrier density at the end of the frame, which, when gates
are absent, is ignored by the detectors. (ii) Use a small classical memory (up to three
consecutive gates), which allows for checking whether she received several consecutive
clicks. These are then sent to Bob as a burst attack. This will lead to a decreased
time between failed attacks and following attacks, which suppresses the afterpulsing by
forcing earlier dead time. (iii) After the burst attack, wait as long as the dead time of
Bob’s detectors, in order to avoid carrier generation and afterpulsing directly after the
dead time.
We perform a simulation of the QBER induced by the attack for varying repetition
rate and channel transmittance. The simulation consists of two major steps. Firstly, Eve
adjusts the number of attacked gates χ in order to adjust the channel transmittance
T to the one anticipated by Alice and Bob. Eve tries to maximize the burst length
in her attack. For a decreasing channel transmittance, Eve, however, receives fewer
photons from Alice. Therefore, the maximal burst length decreases for decreasing
transmittance, see Fig. 7(a). Secondly, the QBER is simulated for 104 frames. The
average QBER is shown in Figure 7(b) and compared to upper bounds of two different
security proofs [5, 26]. The protocol in [26] would require a single photon source and
is therefore not directly applicable in Clavis2. Therefore, we find that the attack can
not compromise the security of Clavis2 due to increased afterpulse probability at the
gate repetition rate of 5MHz. However, the security would be compromised for a
more advanced system using single photons and the protocol in Ref. [26], or for gate
frequencies below about 1MHz. We note that there are numerous experimental setups
and a commercial QKD system [13] working below the critical operation frequency of
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Figure 7. Simulated attack performance for the case when Bob discards clicks during
the detector dead time. (a) Burst length for different channel transmittances and gate
frequencies. (b) QBER generated by the attack. We show contour lines for QKD
security proofs which are more [26] or less [5] tolerant to errors, allowing for a QBER
of 20% or 11%, respectively.
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Figure 8. Simulated attack performance without dead time. The figures show the
QBER generated by the attack taking advantage of the sensitivity of the detectors
during the dead time together with the elongation of the dead time. (a) The QBER
with a perfect Eve. The attack is feasible for all repetition rates and a wide range
of channel transmittances. (b) QBER with a realistic Eve with a detection efficiency
TB = 0.5 and a dark count probability Pdark = 10
−5, corresponding to a technically
advanced but feasible eavesdropper.
about 1MHz. Additionally, technological improvements in the detectors could reduce
the afterpulse effects and thereby enable the attack for high frequencies.
6.2. Strategy of Eve without dead time
Eve can adapt her attack strategy, if she has access to both the after-gate and dead-time
loopholes. In the following, we show a strategy which is not an optimized one, but a
rather intuitive and (as it turns out) successful approach. Eve again attacks the end
of the frame as shown in Figure 6. Her strategy is to attack as frequently as possible.
Thereby, she quickly enters a dead time of Bob’s detectors. She will generate detection
events during the dead time and, thereby, can prolong the detector dead time as shown
in Section 4.2. Ideally, a major part of the attack happens during the dead state, which
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would completely remove the effect of afterpulses and result in negligible QBER for this
part of the attack.
In the simulation, we again adjust the number of attacked gates χ and simulate
the QBER for 104 frames. Figure 8 shows that for high transmittance the QKD system
is vulnerable against the advanced attack, including for an eavesdropper with detection
efficiency implementable today. The photon statistics are maintained during the attack.
It is therefore applicable also to decoy state protocols.
7. Countermeasures
Note that both eavesdropping strategies (especially the latter one) leave strong
fingerprints. In the latter case, the distance between two valid detection events can
be smaller than the dead time of 10µs. Therefore, one countermeasure is to search for
too closely timed detection events. Furthermore, rejecting detections during the dead
time would restrict eavesdropping to lower frequencies as shown by our first simulation
(see Figure 7). A complete protection against the presented attacks is guaranteed if
the detection times are resolved, such that Bob can discriminate between detections
inside and outside the single-photon-sensitive part of the gate. Note however that this
is highly non-trivial since the intrinsic jitter caused by the avalanche build-up is about
equal to the length of the gate itself. Alternatively, a watchdog detector can be placed
at Bob’s input in order to detect bright faked states. Since such a detector cannot be
an avalanche detector (this can be hacked), the countermeasure is only effective against
bright faked states.
8. Conclusions
We have demonstrated that gated detectors in QKD systems can be controlled by an
external eavesdropper using bright laser pulses during the linear mode operation. In
particular, we have analysed the attack parameters for the commercial QKD system
Clavis2 from ID Quantique. In principle, the system is controllable by bright control
pulses arriving after the gate time. However, we have found a side effect: afterpulse
generation due to the faked states. The side effect generates high QBER, and therefore
actually protects the system from a straightforward faked-state attack. Eve can,
however, take advantage of a second imperfection, namely that the system accepts
the bright pulses even in the dead time and, furthermore, resets the remaining dead
time. In a simulation of the attack, we have found that the system is not secure if
clicks during the dead time are accepted. The presented after-gate attack can be used
independently or together with the blinding attack in Ref. [18]. Although the after-gate
attack in contrast to the blinding increases the QBER, it has the advantages that the
optical power sent into the Bob module is weaker. Therefore, the after-gate attack is
harder to detect with a watchdog detector. Another advantage is that this attack can
be applied to detectors that are not blindable.
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ID Quantique has been notified about this loophole prior to the submission of the
manuscript, and has implemented countermeasures.
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